Indiscriminate distribution of resources, impression management and voting

an analysis in the light of rational choice

Abstract

This article discusses, from the perspective of Rational Choice, the existing rationality in the clientelism model that consists of indiscriminate distribution of resources to manage the impression that voters have about the candidate, and the effectiveness of this model in relation to the electorate and the vote. Traditional clientelism consists in an efficient economic practice of benefit maximization, where political candidates buy votes from faithful, tolerant supporters, or undecided. However, Mariana Borges identifies a different model in the Sertão da Bahia, guided by the indiscriminate distribution of resources for managing electorate's impressions, but not necessarily buying votes. In this sense, methodologically, this work consists of a literature review, supported by a case study, seeking to elucidate the scenario thought by Borges, from the theoretical premises of the Theory of Rational Choice. The results suggest that this clientelism model is guided by rationality, however, it does not necessarily lead the candidate to the expected result, considering that the cost-benefit ratio transcends purely psychological factors, listing inherent and immaterial specificities that are inherent to social relations, arising from electoral political processes. Therefore, it is concluded that not distributing resources indiscriminately for managing impressions is irrational, to the point that the benefit ratio is also found in maximizing the candidate's image, as a strong political agent to plead the institutional dispute.