O voto amaldiçoado
repensando o sistema de responsabilização eleitoral
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14244/agenda.2023.1.2Palavras-chave:
Responsabilização Eleitoral, Sistema Representativo Democrático, Comportamento Eleitoral, O Eleitor Racional, Democracias Latino-AmericanasResumo
Este artigo oferece um referencial teórico para esclarecer os equívocos comuns e estabelecer um novo quadro analítico para as discussões acadêmicas sobre a responsabilização eleitoral (electoral accountability). Analisam-se as limitações da eleição como um mecanismo de responsabilização democrática a partir de três níveis: o nível individual dos eleitores, o nível institucional dos sistemas políticos e o nível contextual da sociedade civil. Para concluir, buscamos apresentar uma linha de orientação de política normativa visando à revitalização do sistema de responsabilização eleitoral nas democracias latino-americanas.
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