The conceptions of person and society in the different currents of liberalism

Abstract

The normative status assigned to economic liberties is very important for liberalism. This status determines how different liberal currents interpret the requirements of social institutions and practices common to liberals: constitutionalism and the rule of law, equality of opportunity, free markets, public goods, an adequate social minimum, and the public nature of political power. But what do liberals currents rely on to assign such disparate status to economic liberties? This paper argues that this is due to the distinct ideal conceptions of person and society that these currents hold, and its goal is to delve deeper into what these conceptions are and how they relate to economic liberties, the role of markets, and capitalism. While classical liberals hold an ideal of the rational person and society as the solution to problems of coordination, high liberals hold an ideal conception of the morally free and equal person, and of society as an enterprise of social cooperation among persons conceived in this way. Libertarians regard the person as absolute owners of themselves and society as a free association of such owners.